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Abstract—Consensus protocols are currently the bottlenecks
that prevent blockchain systems from scaling. However, we argue
that transaction execution is also important to the performance
and security of blockchains. In other words, there are ample
opportunities to speed up and further secure blockchains by
reducing the cost of transaction execution.
Our goal is to understand how much we can speed up
blockchains by exploiting transaction concurrency available in
blockchain workloads. To this end, we first analyze historical data
of seven major public blockchains, namely Bitcoin, Bitcoin Cash,
Litecoin, Dogecoin, Ethereum, Ethereum Classic, and Zilliqa.
We consider two metrics for concurrency, namely the single-
transaction conflict rate per block, and the group conflict rate
per block. We find that there is more concurrency in UTXO-
based blockchains than in account-based ones, although the
amount of concurrency in the former is lower than expected.
Another interesting finding is that some blockchains with larger
blocks have more concurrency than blockchains with smaller
blocks. Next, we propose an analytical model for estimating the
transaction execution speed-up given an amount of concurrency.
Using results from our empirical analysis, the model estimates
that 6× speed-ups in Ethereum can be achieved if all available
concurrency is exploited.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consensus protocols are currently the fundamental obstacles
that prevent blockchain systems from scaling. There is a
large gap between the cost of consensus and the cost of
other blockchain layers, in particular the execution and data
model layer [8]. Most recent works that seek to improve
blockchain performance focus on scaling the consensus layer,
either by designing new protocols [9], [20], by leveraging
sharding [5], [12], or by weakening security guarantees [1].
Despite these efforts, state-of-the-art blockchains with novel
consensus protocols can only achieve a few thousands of
transactions per second in throughput, which is far below
what a typical distributed database can do [8], [16]. We argue
that it is time to look at other layers of the blockchain for
opportunities to increase performance.
We posit that the execution layer, where blockchain trans-
actions are executed, offers ample opportunities to improve
both the performance and security of blockchains. There are
three reasons for that. First, many modern blockchains employ
sharding, which splits the network into small committees that
run consensus protocols independently from the other commit-
tees. Within a small committee, the gap between the cost of
consensus and transaction execution shrinks significantly [5].
In other words, reducing the cost of the transaction layer can
lead to significant performance gains at each committee, which
in turn improves blockchain performance as a whole. Second,
some private blockchains such as Hyperledger Fabric [1] aban-
don classic consensus protocols for other designs that require
a trusted third party service, such as the ordering service
discussed in [1]. By sacrificing security, these blockchains shift
their bottlenecks away from consensus to other parts of the
systems, one of which being the execution layer [15], [19].
Third, the cost of executing transactions negatively affects
blockchains’ incentive mechanisms, as captured by the Ver-
ifier’s Dilemma [13]. As a consequence, making transaction
execution faster strengthens the incentive mechanisms, which
in turns strengthens the overall security.
We ask the following question: how much can we speed up
blockchains by speeding up the execution layer? Although a
large number of techniques from databases can be employed to
speed up transaction execution, we focus on a single technique:
exploiting concurrency to execute multiple transactions in
parallel. The fact that existing blockchains execute transactions
in batches (i.e., one batch per block), but within each batch
execute transactions only sequentially, means there could be a
large amount of untapped concurrency.
In this work, we take first steps at answering the above
question. We have two goals. The first goal is to understand
the amount of concurrency available in existing blockchains.
To this end, we conduct an extensive empirical analysis of
seven public blockchains, namely Bitcoin, Bitcoin Cash, Lite-
coin, Dogecoin, Ethereum, Ethereum Classic, and Zilliqa. We
choose public blockchains over their private (or permissioned)
alternatives because of their wide adoption and data avail-
ability. The selected blockchains cover a large design space,
including state-of-the-art sharding-based systems. We measure
concurrency using the conflict rate per block: a lower rate
means higher concurrency. We compare the seven blockchains
against two variants of this metric: the single-transaction
conflict rate, and the group conflict rate. Our analysis differs
significantly from recent work that evaluates concurrency in
Ethereum [17] in that our approach is much more lightweight
and can extract more concurrency, and that our analysis covers
a more comprehensive dataset that includes more than one
blockchain.
Our second goal is to understand how much execution
speed-up can be achieved by exploiting the available concur-
rency. To this end, we propose an analytical model for the
computation of the potential speed-up from the conflict rates
per block. An accurate model is not trivial, because it must
take into account variables other than conflict rate, for instance
the number of cores per machine, scheduling policies, and
sychronization overhead.
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2In summary, we make three important contributions.
1) We present an extensive data-driven analysis of the
amount of concurrency in seven public blockchains. Our
methodology is more lightweight and able to capture
more concurrency from more comprehensive datasets
and systems than existing works.
2) We discuss important findings from the analysis, includ-
ing:
• There is more concurrency in UTXO-based
blockchains than in account-based ones. For example,
the rate of single-transaction conflicts in Bitcoin is
around 13% whereas in Ethereum it is close to 80%.
Although the difference may seem unsurprising because
of the nature of the two data models, a more interesting
observation is that the amount of concurrency in
UTXO-based blockchains is lower than expected. One
extreme example is the Bitcoin block 358624,1 in which
3217 out of the total 3264 transactions are dependent
on each other (i.e., there is no concurrency between
them and they must be executed sequentially).
• In every blockchain, the group conflict rate is lower
than the single-transaction conflict rate. Although this
is true by definition, the difference is considerable. For
example, in Ethereum the former is around 20% whereas
the latter is closer to 60% on average. The implication
is that there is much more concurrency to be exploited
when transactions are considered in groups as opposed
to individually.
• Blockchains with more transactions per block often
have a lower group conflict rate. For example, on
average Ethereum has an order of magnitude more
transactions per block than Ethereum Classic, but its
group conflict rate is much lower than that of the latter,
namely 20% compared to 70%. The implication is that
blockchains with a higher load potentially have more
concurrency, or that blockchains with more users have
both a higher network load and more concurrency.
3) We present a model that enables the extrapolation of
transaction execution speed-ups. Applying the model
to the seven blockchains under consideration, we show
potential performance gains of up to 6×.
The next section presents the relevant background on
blockchains and discusses our motivation for speeding up the
execution layer. Section III details the methodology of our
empirical analysis, including the metrics and data collection
process. Section IV discusses our findings. Section V describes
the speed-up model. Section VI discusses the related work,
before Section VII concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND & MOTIVATION
A. Blockchain Systems
A blockchain system (or blockchain) is a network of nodes
that maintain a replicated, tamper-evident log data structure
called a ledger. The nodes do not necessarily trust each
other. The ledger is a sequence of blocks linked together
1Hash: 0000000000000000162eff5ec874e04dac222a919ca524716eaac575bde4a3da.
via cryptographic hash pointers. Each block contains multiple
transactions that modify some global state. A blockchain can
be examined in four layers: data model layer, consensus
layer, execution layer, and application layer [8]. The first
concerns the storage and nature of the transactions. The second
includes protocols that enable nodes to agree on the ledger.
The third concerns how transactions are executed, and the
fourth includes user applications. We refer readers to [7], [8]
for a comprehensive discussion of the design space and to [10]
for an overview of the potential security pitfalls.
Consensus: Consensus protocols are necessary for the se-
curity of blockchains because they allow decentralized, mu-
tually distrustful nodes to agree on the same ledger. Public
blockchains, in which any node can participate, often use vari-
ants of Proof-of-Work (PoW) protocols [14] which are com-
putationally intensive. Private (or permissioned) blockchains
employ more computionally efficient, classic distributed con-
sensus protocols such as PBFT [4]. However, these protocols
are communication-heavy and do not scale well to large
networks [5].
Data model: The data model determines the nature of the
transactions included in the block, and the operations that can
be performed. Most blockchains employ one of the following
two models: UTXO-based and account-based.
In the UTXO-based model, a transaction takes outputs of
other transactions as inputs and creates its own transaction
outputs (or TXOs). Each TXO contains a value. Outputs of
one transaction can be taken as input of, or spent by, another
transaction. A special type of transaction, called coinbase, has
no input UTXOs and produces one output TXO. Nodes keep
track of unspent TXOs (or UTXOs). A transaction is valid if
the total value of the output TXOs matches that of the input
TXOs,2 and if the input TXOs are in the current UTXO set.
In the account-based model, a transaction makes modifica-
tions to some accounts’ states. For example, a payment trans-
action updates the state representing the balance in both the
sender’s and the receiver’s account. Executing a transaction in
this model involves the invocation of some computation logics,
or smart contracts, that modify the global state. Together with
smart contracts, this model enables blockchain applications
that are more complex and interesting than cryptocurrencies.
Smart contract: A smart contract encodes computation over
the blockchain states. The contract is identified by an address,
and is triggered by sending a transaction to that address.
Smart contracts in different blockchains differ in terms of
contract expressiveness, and in terms of execution runtime. In
particular, some blockchains such as Ethereum support Turing-
complete contracts, which allows user to define arbitrary
computation, whereas others such as Libra [2] support only
a limited set of contracts. Furthermore, some blockchains use
specific virtual machines (e.g., the Ethereum Virtual Machine
or EVM) to execute the contract, whereas others rely on
general-purposed containers (e.g. Docker). Given a block,
existing client software applications execute its transactions
2Minus some transaction fees.
3Data Smart Data
Blockchain model Consensus contracts source
Bitcoin UTXO PoW No BigQuery
Bitcoin Cash UTXO PoW No BigQuery
Litecoin UTXO PoW No BigQuery
Dogecoin UTXO PoW No BigQuery
Ethereum Account PoW Yes BigQuery
Ethereum Classic Account PoW Yes BigQuery
Zilliqa Account PoW+Sharding Yes —
TABLE I: Comparison of seven public blockchains. The
“data source column” indicates whether the blockchain data
is available at sources other than the blockchain client.
sequentially, that is, one transaction at a time and in the order
in which they appear in the block.
Most blockchains that support smart contracts (particularly
Ethereum) allow functions in smart contracts to initiate further
calls to other contracts. These interactions do not appear as
transactions in the blocks, but can still cause write conflicts.
In the rest of this paper, we will refer to these interactions as
internal transactions. In particular, we define as an internal
transaction any interaction between contracts that generates a
so-called trace in the geth client (which was used to create
the Google BigQuery dataset that we use later), and which is
not a regular or coinbase transaction.
B. Public Blockchain Systems
We briefly describe the seven public blockchains that we
examine in this paper. These systems cover a large design
space, including state-of-the-art sharding-based blockchains.
Table I summarizes their characteristics.
Bitcoin: Bitcoin is the oldest and most valuable (in terms
of market capitalization) blockchain that supports only cryp-
tocurrency. It has been online since early 2009. Designed as
an electronic payment system, Bitcoin enables participants
to exchange the platform’s native tokens (which are called
bitcoins) without the need for a trusted third party to validate
the transactions. It uses the UTXO data model, and Proof-of-
Work (PoW) consensus, which requires nodes to solve hard
computational puzzle to create a valid block. This process is
called mining, and the miners are rewarded for their efforts
through the creation of new bitcoins. Bitcoin does not support
smart contracts, but there is a simple scripting language for
transactions.
Bitcoin Cash: Bitcoin Cash is a fork of Bitcoin, resulting
from a dispute in the Bitcoin community about the maximum
block size. Nodes that follow the Bitcoin Cash protocol accept
a larger block size than Bitcoin nodes (8MB instead of
1MB), and are therefore theoretically able to handle a higher
throughput. Bitcoin Cash has the same chain of blocks as
Bitcoin until July 2017.
Litecoin: Litecoin is a Bitcoin spin-off that is mostly based
on the original Bitcoin, except for some minor modifications
including a higher block frequency. Litecoin was launched in
October 2011.
Dogecoin: Dogecoin is designed as a light-hearted cryp-
tocurrency blockchain based on the now-defunct Luckycoin,
which itself is a spin-off of Litecoin. Dogecoin has a higher
block frequency than Litecoin, but is otherwise similar to
Bitcoin and Litecoin. It has been online since December 2013.
Ethereum: Ethereum is the first blockchain platform that
supports Turing-complete smart contracts. It uses a memory-
hard variant of PoW and an account-based data model. Smart
contracts are identified via an address, in the same way
as a regular account. Ethereum miners and other validating
nodes execute the transactions in the blocks in the Ethereum
Virtual Machine (EVM). Each operation in the EVM incurs a
cost called gas that is proportional to its computational cost.
The gas system prevents denial-of-service or bugs caused by
infinite loops and overly costly operations. Ethereum has been
online since July 2015.
Ethereum Classic: Ethereum Classic is a fork of Ethereum
that occurred in July 2016 following a dispute over governance
after the attack on the DAO contract [3]. Ethereum Classic is
currently still highly similar to Ethereum.
Zilliqa: Zilliqa [21] is one of the first blockchains that
use sharding to increase throughputs. In particular, it employs
network sharding which assigns nodes to small committees
such that each committee maintains the complete global state.
Zilliqa adopts the account-based data model and supports
Turing-complete smart contracts. Its scalability comes from the
fact that transactions are processed independently at different
committees that are selected based on the senders’ addresses.
The system uses a combination of PoW and classic consensus
protocols. In particular, nodes run PoW to determine their
committees, and a variant of PBFT [4] to ensure security
at local committees. A major limitation of Zilliqa is that it
does not support cross-shard transactions — ones that touch
multiple committees. In addition, it needs to wait for state
synchronization between committees before transactions are
confirmed. Recent blockchains have addressed these limita-
tions [5], [12], but we consider Zilliqa in this work because
it is the only sharding-based public blockchain that is running
live and that has a considerable amount of traffic.
C. Why Improve the Execution Layer?
We discuss three reasons why it is beneficial to make the
execution layer more efficient. First, as shown in [5], for small
networks, the cost of transaction execution is comparable to,
if not greater than, the cost of consensus. In particular, for a 7-
node private blockchain, the average execution time per block
is 250ms while the average consensus time is 20ms. For a 31-
node network, the average cost for execution and consensus
are similar at around 250ms. In other words, the execution
layer has a large contribution to the overall cost, therefore
making it efficient will lead to significant performance gains.
It might be countered that this observation does not hold in
practice because blockchain networks are large. However, we
note that most modern blockchains use sharding to break up
the network into much smaller committees (or sub-networks),
which means that within each sub-network the cost of the
execution layer remains significant.
Second, some blockchains sacrifice the security of the
consensus protocols for performance, by abandoning PoW and
4other classic Byzantine fault-tolerant protocols. For example,
Hyperledger Fabric employs a Kafka cluster, which does not
tolerate Byzantine failures, to achieve transaction order. As
shown in [15], such designs can shift the bottleneck away from
consensus. For example, in Hyperledger Fabric, the bottleneck
is the endorsing phase which executes (simulates) transactions
before sending them to Kafka. Since the execution layer
becomes a likely bottleneck in these blockchains, reducing
its cost leads to significant performance gains.
Finally, the cost of transaction execution negatively affects
the security of public blockchains, as captured by the Verifier’s
Dilemma [13]. In particular, a rational node has considerable
incentive to skip the transaction execution, and to spend all of
its resources on consensus (for instance, to mine new blocks).
But without a large number of nodes executing the same trans-
actions, the overall security becomes lower because invalid
and malicious transactions can slip through and get recorded
in the ledger. In other words, reducing the cost of transaction
execution helps to strengthen security, because rational nodes
have less incentive to skip transaction execution.
III. METHODOLOGY
In this section we present the methodology behind our
empirical study of the seven blockchain platforms. We begin
in Section III-A with a discussion of the metrics that we seek
to compute. We discuss our data sources in Section III-B, and
the queries for obtaining the metrics of interest from the online
datasets in Section III-C.
A. Concurrency Metrics
We quantify concurrency per block via conflict rates: the
lower the conflict rate, the higher the amount of concurrency.
In the following, we first define conflicts in a model called the
transaction dependency graph. We then derive two metrics
for concurrency, namely single-transaction concurrency, and
group concurrency.
1) Transaction Dependency Graph (TDG): Each block is
modelled as a graph (N,E) where N denotes the set of nodes
and E the set of edges. The nature of nodes and edges depends
on the data model.
• UTXO-based models: each node is a transaction in the
block. An edge exists from a to b, i.e., (a, b) ∈ E, if a
TXO is created in node a and spent in node b.
• Account-based models: each node is an address that is
referenced by a transaction in the block. An edge exists
from a to b if there is a (possibly internal) transaction in
which a is the sender and b is the receiver.
For both data models, we ignore the coinbase transctions
for simplicity. Any two edges in TDG that share an endpoint
are said to be connected. A path is a sequence of connected
edges. Two nodes a, b ∈ N are said to be connected if a path
exists such that a is the first endpoint and b the final endpoint.
A set of nodes C ⊆ N forms a a connected component of
size |C| if all pairs of nodes in C are connected, yet no single
other node in N\C exists that is connected to any node in N .
2) Transaction conflict: In the UTXO-based model, we say
that a transaction t ∈ N conflicts with another transaction
u ∈ N if t and u are part of the same connected component.
In the account-based model, we say that a transaction (a, b)
conflicts with another transaction (c, d) if their endpoints are
part of the same connected component. We say that a trans-
action is conflicted if it conflicts with any other transaction.
3) Concurrency metrics: The following two metrics capture
the amount of concurrency in a block.
• Single-transaction conflict rate. We define the single-
transaction conflict rate as the ratio between the number
of conflicted transactions and the total number of trans-
actions within the block.
• Group conflict rate. Let the LCC size be the size of the
largest connected component (LCC) in a block. We define
the group conflict rate as the relative LCC size, that is,
the ratio between the LCC size and the total number of
transactions in the block.
When we display the evolution of these metrics for the
historical datasets, we will always weight these metrics by
the block size (or gas cost). The reason is that larger blocks
contribute more to the blockchain’s total execution cost than
smaller ones.
4) Examples: Figure 1 shows two examples of TDGs for
account-based models, namely for Ethereum blocks 1000007
and 1000124. The first block (Figure 1a) contains 5 trans-
actions and one coinbase transaction. The number above a
transaction indicates its index in the block’s transaction list.
In this block, transactions 3 and 4 are conflicting because
their endpoints are part of the same connected component.
According to etherscan.io, the 0x2a6... address that
causes the conflict belongs to the DwarfPool mining pool. If
we ignore the coinbase transaction, then the block of Figure 1a
has 5 transactions and 4 connected components, namely 3 of
size 1 and 1 of size 2. Two of its transactions are conflicted,
so its single-transaction conflict rate is 40%, and the group
conflict rate is also 40%.
The second block (Figure 1b) contains 15 regular transac-
tions, one coinbase transaction, and 18 internal transactions.
Transactions 1-9 all send funds to the same address, which
according to etherscan.io is owned by the Poloniex
cryptocurrency exchange. Transactions 10-12 were sent to a
smart contract (which is unverified but which received 73, 369
transactions between January and March 2016). This contract
in turn makes one call to another unverified contract, which
then contacts the contract at 0x276..., which is a verified
contract called ElcoinDb associated with the “ElCoin” ERC20
token. Transactions 13 and 14 are sent by the same address,
which belongs to DwarfPool. The block contains 5 connected
components. Furthermore, 14 out of its 16 transactions are
conflicted, so its single-transaction conflict rate is 87.5%, but
the group conflict rate is lower at 56.25%.
5) Discussion: We remark that our definition of conflicting
transactions is different to that in [17]. In particular, the latter
defines conflict as accessing the same storage location, which
means that two transactions sent to the same addressed may
5null 0xf8b
coinbase
0xeb3 0x828
0
0x529 0x08a
1
0x125 0xfbb
2
0x2a6 0x24b
0xc70
3
4
(a) Ethereum block 1000007.
null
coinbase
0
0x32b
1-9
0x9af
0x115
0x276
10-12 · · ·
13-14
15
(b) Ethereum block 1000124.
Fig. 1: Examples of transaction dependency graphs, for Ethereum blocks 1000007 and 1000124. Solid, dotted and dashed lines
represent regular, coinbase and internal transactions respectively.
not be considered conflicted if they invoke different methods
and access different states. Additionally, it is not entirely
clear from the discussion of their algorithm whether, during a
situation where several transactions access the same memory
location, the first transaction that does so is also considered
as conflicting, or if only the later ones are placed in the
conflicting transaction ‘bin’. Finally, the analysis in [17] does
not consider pure payment transactions, which leads to fewer
transactions per block. Because of these, single-transaction
conflict rates reported in [17] are lower than in ours, indicating
higher concurrency. However, as shown in Section IV, by
using group conflict instead of single-transaction conflict we
are able to extract more concurrency.
B. Data Collection
We collect real data from seven public blockchains. Most
of the datasets are available on Google BigQuery,3 which also
supports large-scale query processing. We leverage this service
for six out of the seven blockchains.4 Most of these datasets
follow a similar format. The datasets for UTXO-based systems
follow the schema of the Bitcoin dataset, and Ethereum Classic
follows the schema of the original Ethereum dataset. They are
queried using SQL and user-defined functions (UDFs) written
in JavaScript, as described in the following section.
Zilliqa is not included in Google BigQuery public datasets,
thus we implemented a lightweight client for downloading the
data from Zilliqa’s mainnet. The client is written in Python
and uses Zilliqa’s Python SDK for querying the blockchain. It
works in two phases. In the first phase, it downloads all trans-
action hashses using GetTransactionsForTxBlock
method. In the second phase, it downloads details for ev-
ery transaction obtained from the first phase, using the
GetTransaction method. Although the SDK throughputs
are low (namely about 4 request per second), the collection
of the entire Zilliqa blockchain is fast because there are only
360K blocks and 2.2M transactions.
3https://cloud.google.com/bigquery/
4https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/data-analytics/introducing-six-
new-cryptocurrencies-in-bigquery-public-datasets-and-how-to-analyze-them
SELECT
block_number,
blocks.block_data[OFFSET(0)] AS num_transactions,
blocks.block_data[OFFSET(1)] AS num_conflict_txs,
blocks.block_data[OFFSET(2)] AS max_lcc_size
FROM (
SELECT block_number,
process_graph(ARRAY_AGG(inputs_merged.txs),
ARRAY_AGG(inputs_merged.spent_txs))
AS block_data
FROM (
SELECT txs.block_number AS block_number,
inputs.spent_transaction_hash AS spent_txs,
txs.hash AS txs FROM
`bigquery-public-data.crypto_bitcoin.transactions`
AS txs, UNNEST(inputs) AS inputs
) AS inputs_merged
GROUP BY block_number ORDER BY block_number
) AS blocks
Fig. 2: An SQL query for the Bitcoin-like datasets.
C. SQL Queries
Since the six Google BigQuery datasets follow only two
schemas, it is sufficient to construct two queries to process the
data. Most of the computationally expensive parts are done
using Javascript UDFs. An example query for the UTXO-
based systems is shown in Figure 2. For each block, the query
creates two equally-sized arrays, inputs_merged.txs and
inputs_merged.spent_txs. The ith element in the for-
mer array is the hash of the transaction that creates the ith
input TXO, and the ith element in the latter is the hash of the
transaction that spends the ith input TXO. The TDG is then
constructed as follows: since each transaction is a node, every
pair in the two arrays defines an edge.
The process_graph computes the metrics of interest. Its
main job is to first create the TDG, and then to determine the
connected components using breadth-first search. We use three
associative arrays as helpers. The first is nbMap, which maps
each transaction to its neighbors in the graph, i.e., those nodes
with which it shares an edge. The second is inBlockMap
which tracks the block the transaction appears in. The third
is visitedMap which tracks whether a transaction has been
6var ccs = [];
for(var i=0;i<txs.length;i++) {
if(visitedMap[txs[i]] == 0) {
var cc = [txs[i]];
visitedMap[txs[i]] = 1;
var neighbors = new Set();
for(let nb of nbMap[txs[i]]) {
neighbors.add(nb);
}
while(neighbors.size > 0) {
var newNeighbors = new Set();
for(let nb of neighbors) {
cc.push(nb);
visitedMap[nb] = 1;
for(let nnb of nbMap[nb]) {
if(visitedMap[nnb] == 0) {
newNeighbors.add(nnb);
} } }
neighbors = newNeighbors;
}
ccs.push(cc);
} }
Fig. 3: An implementation of breadth-first search.
visited during breadth-first search. The core of the algorithm
is shown in Figure 3. The result, ccs, is an array of arrays,
where each element of the main array contains all the hashes
of a connected component. Once the algorithm has finished,
the number of unconflicted transactions equals the number of
elements of ccs with length 1, and the LCC can be obtained
by finding the element of ccs with the largest size.
The query for Ethereum is similar, and is only different in
terms of how the nodes and edges are defined, and requires one
more step where the connected components for the addresses
are mapped to the transactions. Finally, for Ethereum we also
pass a list of transaction gas costs to the UDF, in order to
collect gas-weighted metrics as we discuss in the next section.
For Zilliqa, we first exported the data to a CSV file, after
which we used a similar procedure written in Java to obtain
the TDGs.
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
In this section we present the main findings from the em-
pirical analysis of seven blockchain datasets. In Section IV-A
we compare the concurrency in UTXO-based versus account-
based blockchains. In Section IV-B we examine the differences
between the two main concurrency metrics, namely the single-
transaction and group conflict rates. Finally, in Section IV-C
we discuss the relationship between concurrency and average
block sizes.
We use the SQL queries in the previous section to compute
the two metrics for every block in the history of the seven
blockchains. The figures are generated by dividing these his-
tories into fixed-size buckets for which we compute weighted
averages. The number of buckets ranges from 20 to 200. To
improve the accuracy of our results, we weight each block
either by the number of transactions or by its gas consumption.
In particular, if there is a high variance between the blocks in
terms of the number of transactions or the amount of gas,
then the blocks having more transactions or consuming more
should be weighted more heavily, because they have a greater
impact on the total execution time.
A. UTXO-Based vs. Account-Based Models
We begin our comparison of the two data models with a de-
tailed comparison of the two main cryptocurrency blockchains:
Bitcoin and Ethereum. The results for Ethereum are shown in
Figure 4. Figure 4a shows that the per-block average number
of regular transactions is around 100 per block, and 300
if we include internal transactions. The sharp peaks in the
number of internal transactions in the second half of 2017 are
probably due to denial-of-service attacks that exploited EVM
instructions that were underpriced [3]. The single-transaction
conflict rates shown in Figure 4b are weighted by transaction
count (thick line) and gas (thin line), respectively. We observe
that the transaction-weighted conflict ratio is high, starting
around 80% in 2016 and 2017 before decreasing to around
60%. By contrast, the gas-weighted conflict ratio is roughly
60% since Ethereum’s early days. One possible reason for this
difference is that certain transactions with a very high gas cost
(particularly contract creations) are less likely to be conflicting,
since it is unusual for a single user to create more than one
contract per block due to the high cost of doing so. Figure 4c
shows the group conflict rate, which had a period of decrease
until early 2018, and has been stable around 20% since then.
Figure 5 shows the same graphs for Bitcoin, in which the
conflict rates are weighted by the number of transactions. We
observe that the average number of transactions per block is
currently over 2000, which is greater than for Ethereum. The
average number of input TXOs per block is around 4000.
However, the single-transaction conflict rate for Bitcoin is
currently much lower than for Ethereum, namely roughly 15%
compared to 60%. The group conflict rate is even lower,
namely around 1%. This is to be expected: unlike accounts,
which can send or receive transactions many times, TXOs can
only be created or spent once. The only source of conflict
in the UTXO-based model is when a TXO is created and
spent within the same block. In fact, the frequency with which
this occurs is surprisingly high, and may be due to mining
pools, centralized cryptocurrency exchanges, or because of
higher-level protocols being executed on top of Bitcoin via
its scripting language. An example of a long sequence of
Bitcoin transactions creating and spending each other’s TXOs
is shown in Figure 6. This example is from the Bitcoin block
500, 000. We observe that such sequences on average only
form a relatively small part of the block.
Figure 7 compares the conflict rates for all seven
blockchains, with the UTXO-based and the account-based
ones grouped separately. The same patterns can be observed,
namely that all conflict rates are considerably lower for the
UTXO-based blockchains than for the account-based ones.
However, we note that the account-based blockchains tend to
support a wider and more computationally expensive function-
ality (i.e., smart contracts) than the UTXO-based ones (which
mostly support cryptocurrencies with very limited scripting
support). As the consequence, the higher concurrency on the
latter may not translate to higher speed-ups in absolute terms
than the former. Finally, we attribute the high conflict rates
in Zilliqa to its workload characteristics, since the sharding
design does not introduce any properties that may explain such
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Fig. 4: Ethereum: evolution over time of the transaction load and the conflict rates.
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Fig. 5: Bitcoin: evolution over time of the transaction load and the conflict rates.
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Fig. 6: Example of a transaction sequence in Bitcoin that occurs in the block B at height 500,000. Rectangles indicate
transactions, and contain the first four hexadecimal digits of its hash. Solid rectangles occur within B, and dashed rectangle in
other blocks. Circles indicate TXOs (the values are displayed in bitcoins up to five decimals of accuracy). Dotted lines connect
transactions to their output TXOs, and a solid line indicates that a TXO was used as an input TXO for another transaction.
The sequence start with the transaction 1836b68048373543a5e3557c5b192a92eae07ff7cf0588fceff332bba4e6214f, which occurs in the
block at height 499975. It has two outputs, of which the one with value 1.84052715 in spent in a transaction in B. This
transaction again has two outputs, of which one is again spent in one of B’s transactions. This pattern continues, resulting in
a sequence of 18 transactions within B. The transactions within this sequence must be executed sequentially.
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Fig. 7: The evolution over time of the conflict rates for all 7 blockchains, grouped by data model.
a high rate.
B. Transaction vs. Group Concurrency
Another conclusion that can be drawn from Figure 7 is that
the group conflict rate is significantly lower than the single-
transaction conflict rate. This is to be expected: after all, unless
all transaction are mutually independent, then all transactions
in the largest connected component are necessarily conflicted,
so the single-transaction conflict must always be at least as
high as the group conflict rate. However, the difference is large,
for example the single-transaction conflict rate for Ethereum
is around 60% and the group conflict rate is around 20%. This
suggests that techniques that exploit group concurrency have
much more speed-up potential than ones that only focus on
individual transactions.
C. Small vs. Big Blocks
We examine whether the average number of transactions
has an impact on the conflict rates. In particular, we focus
on the difference between Ethereum and Ethereum Classic.
A fine-grained comparison of the two is shown in Figure 8.
As we can see, Ethereum Classic has an order of magnitude
fewer transactions than Ethereum since early 2018. However,
both the single-transaction and group conflict rates are higher
in Ethereum Classic than in Ethereum, in the latter case
considerably so. This may be surprising, especially for the
single-transaction case: if the size of the user base is similar,
then a higher number of transactions per block means that the
probability that two transactions conflict is higher. However,
since this does not appear to be the case, this must mean that
the user base for Ethereum Classic is relatively smaller than
Ethereum’s.
The same comparison for Bitcoin and Bitcoin Cash is shown
in Figure 9. We observe from Figure 9a that for most of
its history, Bitcoin Cash has fewer transactions than Bitcoin,
at times more than an order of magnitude fewer. This is
remarkable, as the stated reason for the creation of Bitcoin
Cash was to enable bigger blocks and therefore a larger
maximum number of transactions. Despite the smaller number
of transactions, both conflict rates were higher for Bitcoin
Cash than for Bitcoin. Again, this is an evidence that the
user base of Bitcoin Cash is smaller, with the big exchanges
producing a larger share of the traffic.
V. EXECUTION SPEED-UP MODEL
In this section we discuss how the two concurrency metrics
– the single-transaction and group conflict rates – can be used
to predict the potential speed-ups of transaction execution in
a block. Two transactions cannot be executed concurrently
if they access the same memory, which in UTXO-based
models means that they access the same elements of the
UTXO set, and in account-based models that they access
the same account and/or state variables. We note that the
TDG contains all necessary information about the potential
conflicts: if two transactions are not part of the same connected
component, then at no point do they (or internal transactions
resulting from them) conflict. This informs the two approaches
below that approximate execution speed-ups in a model where
transactions in a block have the same execution time. We
begin in Section V-A by describing the technique based
on [17], and highlight that our contributions are the closed-
form expressions for the speed-up potentials. In Section V-B
we describe a technique based on group concurrency. Finally,
we present an empirical evaluation of the potential speed-ups
based on historical datasets for Ethereum in Section V-C.
A. Single-Transaction Concurrency
[17] proposes a speculative execution technique that works
in two phases. In the first phase, all transactions are executed
concurrently, and all transactions that are found to conflict
with other transactions are moved to a sequential ‘bin’. In
the second phase, the transactions in the bin are executed
sequentially. This is done without any a priori knowledge of
which transactions cause a conflict, meaning that the conflict-
ing transactions are executed twice. We derive the following
model that captures this technique.
Let T be the execution time of a given block if all of its
transaction were to be executed sequentially. We can assume
without loss of generality that the execution of a single
transaction takes one time unit (after all, this is just a scale
factor). Let x be the total number of transactions in the block,
so that T = x. Let c be the conflict rate of a block, and n
the number of cores. During the first bx/nc· time units of the
concurrent phase, all cores are busy, and bx/nc·n transactions
can be executed during this phase. The remaining transactions
take a single additional time unit. Hence, the execution time
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Fig. 8: Detailed comparison of Ethereum and Ethereum Classic.
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Fig. 9: Detailed comparison of Bitcoin and Bitcoin Cash
of the first phase takes (bx/nc+ 1) time units in total. In the
second phase, cx transactions need to be executed sequentially,
which takes cx time units. The total execution time of this
protocol, denoted by T ′ is therefore given by
T ′ = bx/nc+ 1 + cx.
To compare the old and new execution times, we define the
speed-up R in the same way as [17], i.e., as the ratio of the
old execution time to the next execution time, or T/T ′. For
the method described above, the speed-up equals
R =
x
bx/nc+ 1 + cx =
1
(bx/nc+ 1)/x+ c . (1)
If we have perfect prior information about which transactions
are going to conflict or not, then we do not need to execute the
conflicted transactions twice, leading to even greater potential
speed-ups. We assume that obtaining such knowledge requires
a numerical pre-processing step that requires K time units. We
then only have to process (1− c)x transaction during the first
phase. The execution time of this scheme is given by
T ′ = K + b(1− c)x/nc+ 1 + cx.
and a speed-up of
R =
1
(K + b(1− c)x/nc+ 1)/x+ c .
This leads to large improvements when the conflict ratio is
high and when the duration of the pre-processing is small
compared to the total execution time. However, in [17] (Sec-
tion 5.5) perfect knowledge of the conflicting transactions was
not found to have a considerable impact in practice. We note
that a further mild improvement is still possible in this case if
bx/nc < x/n, because not all cores will then be busy during
the final time unit of the concurrent phase, which means that
the sequential phase can be started (and completed) one time
unit earlier.
As an example, we consider the two Ethereum blocks of
Figure 1. Recall that the conflict rate for the two blocks are
40% and 87.5%, respectively. If the completely speculative
approach is applied to the block of Figure 1a, then the five
transactions would first be executed concurrently, which can be
done in 1 time unit if n ≥ 5. However, the last two transactions
would need to be rolled back and executed sequentially, which
would take 2 time units. Hence, the new execution time is
given by 3 time units, and because the old execution time
is 5 time units, the speed-up equals 5/3 or roughly 1.67.
Perfect information about the conflicting transaction only leads
to an improvement in the first phase if n < 5, and incurs the
additional cost of the preprocessing step. For the block of
Figure 1b, nearly all transactions must be executed twice, and
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the speed-up is minimal: with 16 or more cores, the first phase
takes 1 time unit, but the sequential phase takes 14 time units.
This leads to a speed-up of 16/15 or roughly 1.07. If between
8 and 15 cores are used, then the first phase takes 2 units, and
the speed-up is therefore equal to 0. If fewer than 8 cores are
used, then the speed-up becomes smaller than 1, which means
that performance becomes worse.
B. Group Concurrency
As discussed previously, we can improve on the perfor-
mance of a fully speculative concurrency technique if we
can perfectly predict which transactions are conflicted. As
discussed in Section III-C, one way to determine the set of
conflicted transactions in a block is to construct the TDG
and use breadth-first search to determine the connected com-
ponents – the conflicted transactions are then those which
share a connected component with at least one other trans-
action. However, instead of executing the full set of conflicted
transactions sequentially, there is still concurrency between
the sets of conflicted transactions that can be exploited. For
example, in the block of Figure 1b, transactions 1-14 are
conflicted, but the set of transactions 1-9 do not conflict with
the set of transactions 10-12, etc. This insight informs our
approximations based on the group conflict rate as given via
the relative LCC size, as the size of largest connect component
is the largest number of transactions that need to be executed
sequentially.
In a system with n → ∞, each connected component can
be assigned to a single core. The maximum completion time
is then L time units, where L denotes the absolute LCC size.
Because the old execution time equals x time units and the
new execution time equals L time units, the speed-up equals
1/l, where l = L/x is the group conflict rate. If n is finite,
then it is impossible to complete execution in fewer than x/n
time units, because this corresponds to the situation where all
cores are busy during the entire execution process. The speed-
up in this case is precisely equal to n. However, since it is still
not possible to speed up beyond 1/l, the maximum potential
speed-up is bounded from above by
R = min(n, 1/l). (2)
To establish a lower bound instead of an upper bound, more
information about the complete structure of the connected
components is known. Determining the optimal schedule to
execute the different connected components on a small number
of cores is equivalent to the multiprocessor scheduling prob-
lem, which is known to be NP-hard [11]. In the following,
we will assume that, for a sufficiently large number of cores,
min(n, 1/l) forms a reasonable approximation of the speedup
and the leave the evaluation of this in practice to future work.
Also note that a computational step is presumably necessary
in this setting, which means that the true speedup is only
min
(
x
x/n+K
,
x
x/l +K
)
,
but the difference is negligible if K is small compared to the
product of the number of transactions and the execution time
per transaction.
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Fig. 10: Potential speed-ups for Ethereum, based on single-
transaction and group concurrency, respectively.
C. Potential Speed-Up
The approximate speed-ups for Ethereum over its history are
shown in Figure 10 for different numbers of cores. To construct
this graph, we combined (1) with the data of Figure 4b. It
can be seen in Figure 10a that the speed-ups predicted by
the single-transaction conflict rate are modest, between 1×
and 2× depending on the number of cores. In some cases,
the speedup was even lower than 1×, which means worse
performance than fully sequential execution. Figure 10b, on
the other hand, shows the predictions made using the group
conflict rate, which combined (2) with Figure 4c. It can be
seen that the speedup in this case is much higher, up to
6× with 8 cores and 8× with 64 cores. We note that to
be able to exploit group concurrency to its full potential,
knowledge of the TDG is needed. However, the TDG uses
information about internal transactions that is not available a
priori. Nevertheless, an approximate TDG can be constructed
by only using information about the regular transactions.
Quantifying the effectiveness of such an approach is left to
future work.
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VI. RELATED WORK
Our work is not the first to look at concurrency in
blockchains. [18] shows that there is inter-block concurrency
in Ethereum that arises when a contract communicates with
the external world, for example, to wait for an input form
outside the blockchain. However, its goal is to demonstrate
safety violations caused by concurrency, whereas our goal is to
exploit concurrency for performance. [6] proposes a specula-
tive execution scheme for transactions within the same block.
It relies on software transaction memory to detect conflicts
and perform execution rollbacks. This work is orthogonal to
ours: in the paper, some concurrency is simulated in a block to
validate the proposed technique, whereas our work sheds light
on how much concurrency there are in existing blockchains.
The work that is most related to ours is [17]. It also
examines potential speed-ups from exploiting concurrency. It
proposes a two-phase technique to do so. First, it executes
the transactions speculatively and detects conflicts at the stor-
age layer. Next, any conflicting transactions are re-executed
sequentially. Our goal is only to quantify concurrency, not
the actual execution of transactions, therefore our approach is
more lightweight and lets us analyze more blockchains and
more complete data. We are also able to extract more concur-
rency than what reported in [17], due to group concurrency
which is not visible at the storage layer.
In the permissioned setting, [19] examines concurrency in
Hyperledger Fabric, which uses a trusted ordering service
instead of a Byzantine fault-tolerant consensus protocol. How-
ever, Hyperledger Fabric’s execution is tightly coupled to the
ordering service, and it is distinctively different to that of
the seven blockchains we consider. By default, transaction
execution in Hyperledger Fabric is concurrent and speculative.
While our goal is to examine how much untapped concurrency
there is, [19] is concerned with a concurrency control mech-
anism that limits transaction aborts.
VII. CONCLUSIONS & DISCUSSION
We have presented our analysis of how much concurrency
is available in existing blockchains. We have considered two
concurrency metrics: the single-transaction conflict rate, and
the group conflict rate. We have examined historical data from
seven public blockchains, and discussed several findings. One
finding is that there is more concurrency in UTXO-based
blockchains than in account-based ones, although the amount
of concurrency in the former is lower than expected. Another
is that some blockchains with larger blocks have more con-
currency than blockchains with small blocks. Finally, we have
proposed an analytical model for estimating execution speed-
up given an amount of concurrency. The model estimates up
to 6× speed-ups in Ethereum using 8 cores.
Our work provides insights into a largely unexplored avenue
for increasing blockchain performance. However, it has several
limitations that we plan to address in future work. One major
limitation is that we have not designed and implemented an ex-
ecution engine that can exploit the available concurrency. The
main challenge is to minimize overhead in building the TDG
and in scheduling concurrent execution. Another limitation is
that we only focused on inter-transaction concurrency at block
level, which leaves other sources of concurrency such as intra-
transaction, inter-block and inter-blockchain unexplored. Ex-
ploiting multiple sources is likely to bring more performance
gains.
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